The State of Play in Poland”s Unconventional Shale and Oil Development by Burnett, J Wesley et al.
Regional Research Institute Publications and
Working Papers Regional Research Institute
8-20-2013
The State of Play in Poland”s Unconventional Shale
and Oil Development
J Wesley Burnett
jwburnett@mail.wvu.edu
Randall Jackson
West Virginia University, randall.jackson@mail.wvu.edu
Robert Blobaum
robert.blobaum@mail.wvu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/rri_pubs
Part of the Regional Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Regional Research Institute at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Regional Research Institute Publications and Working Papers by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @
WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Digital Commons Citation
Burnett, J Wesley; Jackson, Randall; and Blobaum, Robert, "The State of Play in Poland”s Unconventional Shale and Oil Development"
(2013). Regional Research Institute Publications and Working Papers. 14.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/rri_pubs/14
 
Regional Research Institute 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
                                                    
 
The State of Play in Poland’s Unconventional  
Shale and Oil Development 
 
By: J. Wesley Burnett, Assistant Professor, Division of Resource Management, WVU; 
Randall W. Jackson, Professor, Department of Geology and Geography and 
Director, Regional Research Institute, WVU; and Robert Blobaum, Professor, Department of 
History, WVU. 
 
Working Paper Number 2013-06 
 
Website address: rri.wvu.edu 
 
                                      
1 
 
 
 
 
 
The State of Play in Poland’s Unconventional Shale and Oil Development 
 
J. Wesley Burnett*, Randall W. Jackson†, and Robert Blobaum‡ 
August 20, 2013 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Following the huge gas and oil rush in the US, the world’s gas and oil companies have been eyeing 
reserves in other countries including Poland, which is believed to be sitting on one of the largest reserves 
in the European Union. The Poles, seeking to diversify their energy sources and meet EU emissions 
standards, which are driving up electricity costs, met the news with tremendous fanfare. Following initial 
geological assessments, major international oil and gas companies soon made announcements to begin 
drilling operations in Poland. However, one of the major challenges of shale gas development is that it 
often requires voluminous speculative activity before the gas is successfully extracted. In the U.S. this 
was not such a problem because of several adventuresome energy firms willing to take on risk, but in 
Poland (and Europe in general) such firms are rare, and in former communist countries these firms are 
rarer still. This lack of critical infrastructure coupled with bureaucratic red tape in the permitting process 
has led to slow growth in exploration activities in Poland. Will Poland be able to successfully develop 
these resources? This manuscript explores the current state of play in Poland’s unconventional gas and oil 
development. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The recent decision of three energy firms to end their gas exploration in Poland has raised serious 
questions about the commercial viability of unconventional gas development in the country. Canada’s 
Talisman Energy and the U.S.’s Marathon Oil decided to end exploration activities in 2013. This follows 
ExxonMobil’s decision in 2012 to withdraw all exploration activities citing disappointing test drilling 
results. The pullout has raised doubts over the scale of Poland’s shale gas reserves. Further, company 
executives complain about opaque environmental regulations, slow permitting processes, and a general 
lack of a national legislation on shale gas development. 
 The mania over hydrocarbon development in Poland was triggered by a U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA, 2011) report that claimed that the country has 187 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of 
technically recoverable shale gas resources, enough to meet domestic demand for over 300 years. 
Following the EIA’s report, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and Polish Geological Institute (PGI) 
collaborated on a preliminary assessment of shale gas and oil in Poland. The organizations released 
independent assessments of technically recoverable shale gas and oil. PGI estimated significantly less 
technically recoverable resources, approximately 8 to 22 Tcf, with an additional 1.6–2 billion barrels 
(BBL) of oil (Polish Geological Institute, 2012a). The USGS, on the other hand, estimated about 1.34 Tcf 
of shale gas and 0.17 BBL of shale oil (U.S. Geological Survey, 2011). 
 Why the large difference in assessments? A recent EIA report claims that both PGI and USGS 
studies were based on conventional oil development and gas logs, core, and seismic data collected during 
the 1970s and 1980s, and that neither study cited recent data from industry exploration programs in 
Poland (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013). The same EIA report also attributed the 
discrepancy to differences in methodologies. The bottom line is that Poland still does not contain any 
empirical shale production data because no company has yet successfully developed shale gas resources 
in large enough commercial quantities. Until such resources are recovered, no one knows exactly how 
much technically recoverable resources are available in Poland. 
 This manuscript explores the current state of play in Poland’s unconventional gas and oil 
development. Based upon current studies and the authors’ own recent visit to Poland, this manuscript is 
meant to elucidate the true state of play as experienced at ground zero. After interviews with numerous 
stakeholders, including academicians, US and Polish governmental officials, and industry representatives, 
this study offers an objective perspective into this shale play. 
 We intend to debunk three popular myths about Poland and its shale play. The first is that Poland 
is wholly dependent on Russia’s natural gas to meet its current energy needs. The second is that Poland 
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has no proven resources of shale gas for significant commercial exploitation. The third myth is that the 
Polish government sees the development of this resource as a game changer for its energy future. 
 In the next section we offer a brief history of post-communist Poland and its transition to a 
modern capitalist-style economy. In section three we discuss Poland’s current energy mix and the 
government’s energy plan through 2030. In section four we outline current industry activity to date, 
including recent exploratory activity. Finally, in section five we discuss the future challenges to shale gas 
and oil development, and the country’s prospects of using this resource as a bridge to a less-carbon 
intensive energy future. 
 
 
2 Post-Communist Poland and the Transition to a Capitalist-Style 
Economy 
 
Despite the existence throughout the communist era of a large private agricultural sector and selected 
small-scale private retail and service sectors, the economy of the Polish People’s Republic had practically 
collapsed by the end of the 1980s. Attempts in the early 1970s to stimulate the economy by attracting 
foreign investment and credits without fundamental reform of the central planning system left Poland 
with many fundamental problems including a huge foreign debt that it struggled to service, runaway 
inflation, crumbling infrastructure, rationing of basic consumer goods, a rampant black market, and 
widespread corruption. The resulting social and political unrest led to the emergence of the Solidarity 
movement in the summer of 1980, which following its suppression at the end of 1981 and retreat to the 
underground, still retained sufficient support to frustrate efforts of the Polish government to introduce 
limited, market-oriented economic reforms and more representative institutions. The stalemate was finally 
resolved by the compromise of semi-free national elections held in the summer of 1989, which created the 
Solidarity-led government, along with communist participation, in September (Stokes, 2011; Ekiert and 
Kubik, 1999). 
 In spite of this government’s hybrid nature, a strong political consensus existed for the radical 
economic reforms of “shock therapy,” guided by the first post-communist finance minister, Leszek 
Balcerowicz. The basic idea was to achieve macroeconomic stability as quickly as possible by 
maintaining budgetary austerity while pursuing unconstrained price liberalization. These shocks were to 
be followed by currency reform, privatization of state-owned property, the creation of a stock market, the 
overhaul of the existing tax structure, and the establishment of the legal and regulatory structures of a 
market economy. For the most part, these reforms, though initially quite painful in social terms, were 
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ultimately successful. Inflation was brought under control, the government was able to renegotiate the 
foreign debt and receive new loans, the Polish złoty became a convertible currency, which enhanced trade 
with new Western partners, and the Polish stock market became one Europe’s largest and best-
performing. At the turn of the millennium, Poland had largely met the economic criteria for accession to 
the European Union, which it entered in the first round of expansion in 2004. Two decades following the 
Balcerowicz reforms, Poland’s economy had become characterized by moderately steady and healthy 
growth rates that gradually reduced unemployment. Though economic growth has been slowed 
considerably by the Great Recession and the crisis of the Eurozone in recent years, Poland has managed 
to avoid a decline in its GDP. 
 However, due to Poland’s “negotiated revolution” in 1989, the break with the communist era was 
less pronounced in certain key areas. Brakes were applied to privatization of potentially more profitable 
state-owned enterprises when it became clear that the main beneficiaries were former communist power-
holders and managers. Moreover, Polish nationalists, who emerged as a major force in post-communist 
Poland, opposed foreign (especially German) owner-ship and large foreign investments. Privatization was 
thus a slow and uneven process, beginning most successfully in the retail sector, and eventually 
embracing the banking and telecommunications industries. The steel and shipbuilding industries, once 
showpieces of the command economy, eventually were sold to private, mainly foreign, investors and their 
labor forces were dramatically downsized. By contrast, rail and air transportation remain under the 
management of the state, which retains majority ownership of shares that are traded on the stock market. 
This is also true of Poland’s energy sector, whose central executive officers – whether their firms are 
involved in production, refinement or utilization – are state appointees. Three major firms dominate 
Poland’s oil and gas market, the largest of which is PGNiG (Polish Oil and Gas), followed by Orlen and 
Lotos, all offspring of the state monopoly of the communist era. The majority of shale concessions thus 
far have been awarded to these Polish firms led by PGNiG, an indication of the Polish state’s view of 
unconventional gas exploration and extraction as a “national project,” rather than one dependent on 
foreign investment. 
 The state thus remains a major player in the Polish economy and the main player in the 
development of the country’s energy resources. Aside from significant foreign capital investment, the 
obstacles to which are discussed below, only the Polish state possesses the financial resources to stimulate 
research and development of unconventional oil and gas. Its decision to invest major sums in 
industrial/academic collaboration through the “Blue Gas” Project (The National Centre for Research and 
Development, 2012), which is specifically targeted at developing “Polish” technologies of unconventional 
gas exploration and extraction, is a significant development. On the other hand, as revealed by the recent 
firings at PGNiG over the firm’s dealings with Gazprom, important decisions affecting the energy sector 
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are often based on political rather than economic criteria, which serve as a reminder of communist-era 
practices. 
 Moreover, the state doesn’t speak with one voice on energy policy. Instead there is cacophony of 
competing interests within Poland’s coalition government, within the parties that make up the coalition, 
and among ministries. In the case of shale gas exploration and development, the Ministry of Finance, 
whose authority embraces supervision of the national energy firms, has been an enthusiastic and 
aggressive player, although its sails have been trimmed somewhat in recent months due to the controversy 
at PGNiG, which led to the resignation of the Finance Minister. The Ministry of Environment, in charge 
of drafting regulatory legislation in a difficult political climate, has adopted a more cautious approach that 
is sensitive to EU concerns. The Ministry of Science and Higher Education, on the other hand, has 
embraced energy-related research and development within its strategic plan and is in charge of 
administering Blue Gas funding. The Ministry of Economy, ostensibly in charge of energy policy and the 
author of the 2009 plan (see below), has had little to say about unconventional resources compared to its 
aforementioned counterparts. This is perhaps because the portfolio has been entrusted to the junior 
coalition partner, the agrarian Polish People’s Party, which is not anxious to rock the EU boat since 
Poland (and especially Polish agriculture) is a major recipient of EU structural funds. The influence of 
competing coal and oil/gas lobbies on the government is also a significant factor. Despite the existence of 
an “energy plan,” Poland does not have an energy policy that includes unconventional gas and that could 
guide and coordinate the activities of the various ministries involved. 
 The absence of a clear energy policy in Poland, of course, is not necessarily a legacy of 
communism. However, popular distrust of the state is such a legacy, especially since communist-era 
corruption was never really eradicated, while the successor parties of the Solidarity movement have had 
corruption scandals of their own. The creation of a Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (known by its Polish 
initials as CBA) in 2005 by the governing coalition led by the Law and Justice party was a response to 
this phenomenon, but the CBA itself was immediately transformed into a political tool used to attack Law 
and Justice’s political opponents. Although the power of the CBA declined after the defeat of Law and 
Justice in the 2007 parliamentary elections, the popular perception of corruption of state officials is so 
strong that it has affected the relationship of government agencies with the private sector. Consequently, 
the business climate in Poland is considered by many to be relatively unhealthy compared to other EU 
member states. Particularly as Poland’s impressive post-communist economic performance has given way 
to stagnation in the last few years, respect for the political process and the parties involved in it have 
fallen to an all-time low. Thus, the Polish state – even if it did speak with one voice or had an energy 
policy – would face an uphill battle in convincing public opinion especially at the local level of the 
benefits of development and the management of risks should shale gas resources prove to be recoverable 
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in commercially viable quantities. However, given the state’s major involvement in the energy sector, 
only it and its representatives can play this public relations role. Thus far, their performance has not been 
particularly impressive. 
 
 
3 Poland’s Current Energy Mix and the Energy Policy 2030 Plan 
 
3.1 Poland’s Current Energy Mix 
 
Poland is currently the largest producer of hard coal in the EU, and its energy import dependence is 
among the lowest in the EU (European Commission, 2007). Hard coal and lignite play a significant role 
in Poland’s energy mix, providing the largest share of electricity generation (approximately 92–94%) and 
resulting in high emissions and carbon dioxide (CO2) intensity (Nyga-Lukaszewska, 2011). The primary 
reason for Poland’s heavy reliance on coal is due to its vast domestic deposits.  According to the PGI 
(2012b), the country still contains over 25 billion metric tons of non-exploited hard coal deposits. At 
current rates of consumption – approximately 81.5 million metric tons of coal as of 2010 (European 
Commission, 2012a) – these non-exploited deposits are enough to potentially last the country for several 
centuries. It is of no surprise then that coal still plays a vital role in the country’s energy policy plan 
through 2030 (discussed below). 
 Poland’s concern, in addition to environmental impacts of coal development and consumption, is 
its over-reliance on one resource. Therefore, one of the primary objectives of the energy policy plan is to 
diversify Poland’s energy resources with a mix of nuclear and renewables. Unconventional fossil fuel 
development was not part of the national dialogue prior to the energy policy plan’s publication in 2009, 
other than discussions related to coalbed methane (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1991). 
 Other fossil fuel use in Poland represents a smaller portion of the primary energy supply, but the 
demand for these resources has been growing over the past two decades. Figures 1 and 2 show trends in 
Poland’s energy supply and demand for the years 1990, 2000, and 2010 – these Figures are based on 
domestic production and consumption excluding imports. There are legitimate fears in Poland over 
energy security as Russia is Poland’s largest natural gas and petroleum supplier, but Poland is not the 
grips of Russian energy suppliers such as Gazprom and Rosneft. Poland’s energy mix is largely still 
dominated by hard coal, which it develops from its own resources. Nonetheless Poland’s demand for 
petroleum and gas has increased over the past three decades by approximately 96% and 42%, 
respectively, and it is almost completely reliant on other countries for its gas needs as domestic gas 
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production only made up 3.7% of its energy mix in 2010. Over the same period, Poland’s demand for 
solid fuels, including hard coal, has decreased by approximately 45%. 
 Poland is the EU’s largest producer of hard coal and the second largest in Europe, following 
Russia. Electricity generation in Poland is based almost exclusively on domestic coal. Coal’s 92% share 
in electricity generation in 2004 was highest among the EU member states. The share of natural gas in 
generation is very small, but it has been increasing over the past few years. Only a small percentage of 
electricity comes from oil and renewable sources, although this has been growing slowly as well. 
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Figure 1: Poland’s Energy Supply (Mtoe), 
1990-2010 
 
 
(a) 1990 
 
 
(b) 2000 
 
 
(c) 2010 
 
Figure 2: Poland’s Energy Demand (Mtoe), 
1990-2010 
 
 
(a) 1990 
 
 
(b) 2000 
 
 
(c) 2010 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2012a) 
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3.2 Poland’s Energy Policy 2030 Plan 
 
The Ministry of Economy was commissioned several years ago by Poland’s national government to create 
an energy policy plan for Poland through 2030. According to this energy policy report (Polish Ministry of 
Economy, 2009), Poland’s primary objectives of energy policy are to: improve energy efficiency; 
enhance security of energy supplies; diversify the electricity generation structure by introducing nuclear 
energy; develop renewable energy sources; develop competitive fuel and energy markets; and, to reduce 
the environmental impact of the power industry. Noticeably missing from the report are any references to 
unconventional fossil fuel development other than the broad objective of developing “competitive fuel 
and energy markets.” The reason for the omission of unconventional fuel development is due to the 
timing of the report which was published in 2009, while the unconventional natural gas resource 
assessments by the EIA, PGI, and USGS were published later. Historically, attention to unconventional 
gas focused on coalbed methane and tight gas (International Energy Association, 2012). Poland’s energy 
policy report makes several references to coalbed methane, not only for ensuring the safety of mining 
operations but also for industrial use. The report briefly mentions extending the natural gas extraction 
capacity in Poland to support the diversification of the country’s resources for energy security reasons. 
 The full thrust of the report is on diversifying into nuclear energy, which is sensible given EU 
member requirements for participating in the emissions trading system and the accompanying need for 
low CO2 emission generating technologies. The report calls for a launch date of 2020 for the country’s 
first uranium powered plant, which Poland plans to develop domestically or obtain “from politically 
stable regions.”  The country plans to build a second reactor shortly thereafter. The report mentions that 
such an investment would be costly but does not discuss financing. 
 A looming problem in Poland is its rapidly aging coal-dependent power sector. Approximately 
44% of Poland’s existing power plants are over 30 years old (Trojanowska, 2012). This problem is 
exacerbated given that the country is also abandoning plans of adding coal-fired plant capacity as it 
moves to less carbon-intensive technologies. The estimated costs of rebuilding the capacity for the aging 
plants is approximately $68B (U.S. dollars) or €50B (Easton, 2010). Further, Poland cannot rely upon on 
neighbors like Germany and the Czech Republic because they too are abandoning plans for new coal-
fired capacity. Some have claimed that Poland’s installed power generation capacity will be obsolete by 
2016 (Easton, 2010). To overcome this problem, the thrust in the energy plan is to reduce dependency on 
coal and lignite by 40% over the next twenty years. 
 Again due to the timing of its publication, missing from the report are possible discussions of 
natural gas-fired generation. According to a report by the World Nuclear Association (2013), nuclear is 
cost competitive with other forms of electricity generation, except where there is direct access to low-cost 
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fossil fuels. In the U.S., only two nuclear reactors have been approved by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) for construction since 1979.  The NRC has received applications from 24 more 
reactors, but none is likely to be built soon given the boom in shale gas development and the subsequent 
downward pressure on natural gas prices (The Economist, 2013). The past 20 reactors built in the U.S. 
have cost between $3 to $6 billion, or $3000 to $6000 per kilowatt hour (Hinrichs and Kleinbach, 2013). 
A gas-fired plant costs almost ten times less and can be built much more quickly. Natural gas-fired 
electricity too offers the benefit of being less carbon intensive than coal-fired electricity. The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (2013) estimates that natural gas fired plants produce half as much 
carbon dioxide, less than a third as much nitrogen oxides, and one percent as much sulfur oxides as 
comparable coal-fired plants. Thus, Poland will have to assess not only the net present value of 
constructing new electricity generation capacity, but also the cost of carbon dioxide emissions and the 
opportunity cost of foregone natural gas generation that is far cheaper and brought online quicker than 
nuclear generation. It is little wonder then why the Prime Minister Donald Tusk recently hinted at 
delaying the country’s first nuclear power plant (Agence France-Presse, 2013b). 
 
 
4 Poland’s Current Shale Gas Development 
 
Figure 3 offers a detailed geographic map of Poland’s shale reserves. The darker orange color represents 
non-prospective resources for commercial development, whereas the area in the lighter yellow color 
represents prospective resources. Prospective resources are potentially recoverable fossil fuels from 
“undiscovered” accumulations by the application of future development projects. Non-prospective 
resources are quantities of petroleum (including natural gas) potentially recoverable from “known” 
accumulations that are not yet mature enough for commercial development (American Association of 
Petroleum Geologists, 2011). The non-maturity of the play is why shale or tight gas development is often 
referred to as “unconventional” development; otherwise, were the techniques “conventional,” we would 
observe the resource being developed in commercial quantities. Currently, most of the shale play activity 
is concentrated in the Lower Paleozoic sedimentary basin, which exists as a north to southeast band 
through the center of Poland (U.S. EIA, 2013). The Baltic Basin shale formation lies north of Warsaw 
while the Lublin Basin is southeast of Warsaw. The prospective shale formation to the east of Warsaw is 
the Podlasie Basin. Not displayed are other prospective formations in and around the area of Krakow in 
the south central part of the country. 
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Figure 3: Map of Shale Gas Basins in Poland (Source: Dittrick (2011)) 
 
 
 
 Figure 4 displays a detailed map of the current “concessions” for shale gas development and 
exploration in Poland through May 31, 2013. A concession is similar to a “lease” in U.S. parlance. The 
difference is that the Polish state owns all of the mineral rights below the surface. This differs from the 
U.S. where the surface and mineral rights may be owned by a private party, in which case the developer 
would sign a legally-binding lease with the private land owner to extract the resource. The legend in the 
lower left-hand corner of the map is difficult to read, but the brighter red color denotes the shale gas 
exploration concessions. The lighter red or pink color denotes pending applications; the darker gray color 
denotes conventional gas prospective concessions; and lighter gray are conventional gas pending 
applications. The other two colors pertain to pending applications submitted under Poland’s Act on 
Geological and Mining Law, which was designed to increase the efficiency of development by 
formalizing the concession application process (Polish Ministry of the Environment, 2011). It is not 
surprising that the shale gas exploration concessions (dark red) are primarily concentrated along Lower 
Paleozoic sedimentary basin, which is the orange band in Figure 3 running from the north to the southeast 
of Poland. Most of the exploratory concessions are located in the non-prospective Baltic, Lublin, and 
Podlasie Basins. As mentioned above, there are other prospective resources in the south central portion of 
the country around Krakow and to the west, so we see other concessions appearing in those parts of the 
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country as well. Furthermore, some concessions have been granted for off-shore shale gas development 
north of Gdansk in the Baltic Sea. 
 
Figure 4: Map of Shale Gas Concessions in Poland, May 31, 2013 
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4.1 Ground Zero 
Not displayed in either of the figures above is the actual state of play, or the political economy, in regards 
to shale oil and gas development in Poland. The authors visited Poland in June 2013 and conducted 
extensive interviews with stakeholder groups including academic researchers, governmental officials 
(including in-country U.S. Embassy and Consulate representatives), oil and natural gas industry officials, 
and private citizens. As a former communist country, there are several things about Poland that make the 
environment vastly different from that of the United States.  
 First, outside of the press there is little to no public discourse surrounding this contentious issue 
in Poland. The stakeholder groups are mutually frustrated, but there are rarely if ever opportunities for all 
parties to meet and discuss these issues in a public forum. This lack of discourse stems from the absence 
of a tradition of academic, governmental, and industrial stakeholder collaboration and partnership. The 
culture is changing slowly as demonstrated by the state’s Blue Gas project, which is designed to foster 
such collaboration but still exists mostly on paper. 
 Second, the U.S. has a long history of prospective activities in the oil and gas industry. The early 
history of this development conjures up images of “wildcatters” in 19th century Pennsylvania and early 
20th century Texas, in which entrepreneurs took on huge risks drilling for oil in unknown fields in hopes 
of striking it rich. The American market economy helped foster not only this spirit of entrepreneurship but 
also the growth of a vast support infrastructure for the industry and related activities. Over generations, 
American firms have developed an expertise in both conventional and now unconventional resource 
extraction and development. Moreover, the U.S. was in some ways poised for this boom because of a 
well-polished legal and policy environment after a century and half of domestic oil and gas development 
and production. 
 The culture of entrepreneurship is embodied in the story of the late George P. Mitchell, founder 
of Mitchell Energy. Mitchell is often regarded as the father of hydraulic fracturing. By the 1980s, many 
people in the U.S. oil and gas industry realized that drilling opportunities were on the decline, but they 
also knew about the potential resources of oil and gas trapped in shale deposits. Mitchell led a twenty-
year effort to find an economical way to extract these vast resources (Tubb, 2013) and spent millions of 
his own money developing this highly prospective resource, until his team (with U.S. Department of 
Energy support) found a way to combine hydraulic fracturing with horizontal (or directional) drilling. But 
even after successfully developing these technologies, hundreds more exploratory wells were drilled 
before successfully extracting the shale gas resources in commercial quantities. Mitchell’s efforts 
eventually set off a domino effect in the U.S. and reignited the floundering natural gas industry. 
 The culture of entrepreneurship is largely absent in Poland’s energy sector given the role of the 
state in communist and post-communist eras. Prior to 1990 the energy industry, including oil and gas, was 
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controlled by central planners and all industry activity including resource extraction was coordinated by 
the state. In stark contrast to the U.S., there was no incentive for private industry to develop prospective 
and potentially lucrative energy resources since the central government owned all mineral rights. As a 
result, the oil and gas industry was left with an aging infrastructure with little or no equipment for drilling 
or exploration. Furthermore, Communist Poland had price controls on oil and gas that artificially distorted 
prices and led to perverse economic incentives not conducive to market-economy type extractive 
enterprises. 
 The time needed to support this shale play is manifested in Poland’s current regulatory and tax 
hurdles. After the EIA and PGI reports in 2010, foreign companies with the necessary financial resources 
and hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling knowhow came rushing into the country. The authors’ 
interview with gas industry personnel revealed that the industry is frustrated over uncertainties 
surrounding future tax policies, but the industry was most upset about the length of time required to 
receive and modify drilling permits. Particularly upsetting was the fact that Poland only granted permits 
to drill up to 5,000 meters; however, unlike the U.S., the shale formations are extremely deep in Poland. 
So developers had to reapply for a modification to the concession if the driller had to go deeper than the 
original 5K meters depth. In the U.S. modifications to permits vary by state, but the process generally 
takes no more two to three weeks. In Poland, industry representatives complained of modifications – 
sometimes requiring new environmental impact statements – taking as long as eight months to receive the 
necessary permits to drill deeper. The additional time and uncertainty are very costly for oil and gas 
development, and partially explain some companies’ abandonment of operations in the country. In 
response to industry complaints, the Environmental Ministry pointed to the fact that many early permits 
had been granted without impact statements, which explained the “new” requirement, but also developed 
a new draft regulation to expedite the permitting process.  
             At the same time the EU has created new obstacles to streamlining this process. In the U.S., the 
State government is recognized as a sovereign authority over its territory, and as such is responsible for 
the oil and gas drilling permitting process and oversight. The federal government only gets involved if 
permitting is required to drill on federal lands. Otherwise, its major role has been providing research and 
policy guidance to state government. Poland, on the other hand, is a sovereign state, but as a member of 
the EU it must comply with EU rules. Despite Poland’s support for this potential energy “revolution,” 
many EU countries are less than enthusiastic. For example, France, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Germany, 
Romania, Czech Republic, and Ireland have all either declared a moratorium or are planning such against 
hydraulic fracturing due to uncertainties over environmental impacts. Therefore, several EU members are 
urging Poland to slow drilling activities to further assess these impacts. To this end, the Environmental 
Commission within the EU has accepted very restrictive draft regulations for hydraulic fracturing and 
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horizontal drilling that would require environmental impact assessments at every stage of investment and 
exploration. This could potentially create further delays in the permitting process in Poland and further 
reduce the profitability of extraction for foreign companies. However, the EU Environmental chief Janez 
Potocnik has announced that the organization will not impose a member-wide ban on hydraulic fracturing 
(Agence France-Presse, 2013a). Further, the European Commission (EC) maintains a position of 
neutrality toward fracking and horizontal drilling and has claimed that it will leave it to Member States to 
accept or reject these technologies (EC, 2012b).
1
  However, the EC claimed that it would ensure 
compliance with all EU shale gas extraction legal requirements. Therefore, as Poland strives to put its 
own regulatory house in order, it also must balance its shale development with EU demands. This will not 
have a direct impact on extraction per se, but it will likely create further delays in a country already 
saddled with regulatory and tax hurdles. 
  The final difference that sets Poland apart, and a culmination of all the challenges listed above, is 
that to date only forty-four exploratory hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling wells have been drilled 
in the country since the shale gas was first discovered. In the U.S., since Mitchell Energy’s first 
exploratory well in 1981 (National Energy Technology Laboratory, 2011), it drilled hundreds if not 
thousands more until it finally got the formula right and was able to extract the shale gas in commercial 
quantities. To our knowledge only one well has been successfully fracked in Poland. San Leon Energy 
announced in July 2013 that it had successfully completed a well in the Baltic Basin (near Gdansk) that 
was producing 120 barrels per minute at pressure (San Leon Energy). Only time will tell whether San 
Leon and others will develop this resource in commercial quantities. Given the ingenuity and technical 
knowhow of American firms in the region, it is likely that it will not take as much time to successfully 
develop this resource in Poland as it did in the early years of U.S. development. But if Poland wants to 
develop this resource in significant quantities it must remove the regulatory barriers to attract more 
foreign investment and allow for more exploratory wells in the country. This can only be done with 
significant regulatory reform in cooperation with the EU and European Commission. As Poland 
experimented with free-market reforms in the early years after the fall of communism, it must today take 
bold actions to entice foreign companies to help it develop this resource. Otherwise, it will continue to 
lose the support of foreign investors. 
  
                                                 
1
 The European Commission is simply the executive body of the European Union. 
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5 Poland’s Future Challenges to Unconventional Shale and Oil 
Development 
 
Shale gas holds the promise of contributing to the Polish economy while providing a bridge to a less 
carbon-intensive future. Poland’s situation has much in common with similar developments in the U.S. 
However, these opportunities in Poland and other resource rich regions poised for development bring with 
them substantial challenges. To maximize the benefits and minimize the costs and disruption that can 
accompany these kinds of developments, Poland might do well to note the experiences of other regions 
that have undergone rapid development, often followed by rapid declines in economic activity once the 
resource extraction activities inevitably subside. 
 Whereas the resource curse phenomenon is most often associated with nation states, the boom 
and bust cycle “boom- town” model applies to localized consequences of resource based economic 
development. These terms refer to the situation in which smaller regional economies and communities are 
overwhelmed by rapid population growth and its various challenges.  Few local governments are prepared 
to deal with the multitude of issues that accompany rapid growth of any kind, much less those specifically 
associated with energy extraction. Even those that excel in anticipating the impacts of rapid development 
often find, at best, that needed revenues for meeting new community needs lag behind the needs 
themselves or at worst, are lacking altogether (Jacquet, 2009). 
 Of course, some local area residents will benefit from the economic boom. This group includes 
those involved with construction, drilling, consulting, and environmental research companies, 
construction equipment suppliers, transportation services, law, well site operators, and business and 
professional services. There also will be job gains and economic growth for those who can participate 
directly in energy industry sectors, especially young and otherwise unemployed workers. 
 Likewise, the expenditures associated with the extraction activities and the associated workforce 
can be substantial, and have the potential to significantly benefit local economies. The scope of such 
impacts will depend in part on the extent to which local residents fill new energy sector jobs, vacancies 
left in lagging sectors as employment shifts to the leading energy sector, and the ability of the local 
workforce to meet new energy sector needs. Any imports from outside of the local region, such as 
materials, supplies, goods, and services, are expenditures not available for local economy recirculation 
(Kelsey et al., 2012). 
 When local communities are unable to satisfy industry and its workers’ needs, neighboring 
communities and regions can also be affected. Positive impacts include new revenues to existing 
businesses. Negative impacts can include substantial stresses and inflationary pressures on transportation 
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infrastructure, housing, and various service sectors. Boomtown research (Jacquet, 2009; Longbrake and 
Geyler, 1979) has documented substantial increases in social problems, particularly those due to an influx 
of transient workers, including substantial increases in arrest rates and judicial system overloads. In cases 
where drilling sites are in neighboring jurisdictions, there can be a mismatch between the administrative 
units receiving severance taxes or impacts fees and those bearing the cost of providing additional services. 
 The temporal aspects of boom and bust cycles also present challenges. There can be increased 
needs during boom phases for public support infrastructure, including schools, health care facilities, 
emergency services, and the kinds of water, sewage treatment, and utilities infrastructure needed for 
supporting new residential areas. If communities have not diversified their economies in advance of the 
bust phase of the cycle, they can easily find themselves with excess capacity they cannot afford to 
continue supporting once economic activity declines to lower levels (Markussen, 1978). 
 Consistent with resource curse literature, resource rich regions tend not to diversify (Boettner and 
O’Leary, 2011). For example, in the energy rich U.S. State of West Virginia with its long history of 
extractive industries, fourteen coal-economy based counties have the least economic diversity of the fifty-
five counties in the State. Indeed, the legacy of resource abundance appears to be lower median household 
incomes, higher family poverty rates, lower education levels, and poorer health outcomes. Thus, resource 
extraction does not appear to be a pathway toward long-term growth and prosperity (Markussen, 1978). 
 Despite the potential for negative impacts, energy prices will almost certainly reach levels that 
make the extraction of shale gas and oil economically feasible. The regions with these resource 
endowments have the potential for a large inflow of money, and following the natural cycles of its 
development, these regions will experience the transitory and fluctuating nature of extractive wealth 
(Kay, 2011). Anticipating this development, insightful policymakers will have planned for the long-term, 
well beyond the boom, and learned that growth and development are not always one and the same. 
Resources are a place-bound national inheritance, and although there are always political pressures to 
grow quickly, there can be substantial benefits to deferring extraction until the prices rise to levels that 
can generate enough revenues to leave the region better off than before the activity began. Controlled 
growth enables effective planning, policy, and programmatic implementation. 
 Communities can maximize the potential for long-run economic growth by first establishing a 
social license, and second, by investing portions of resource revenues wisely. Public campaigns to 
educate and inform local populations can facilitate the former, and the latter can be achieved by 
developing a gas revenue-based fund dedicated to promoting economic diversification and development, 
and reinvesting in physical and social infrastructure, especially focusing on the development of a highly 
educated and highly skilled workforce that can support comprehensive economic development. 
18 
 While Poland might successfully develop its shale gas resource, it appears to be entirely 
unprepared to deal with the pending social and economic consequences identified by the resource curse 
and boomtown literatures. During the authors’ visit to Poland, we were unable to identify anyone in the 
country, including the academic institutions, addressing the downstream public policy dimensions of 
rapid resource development. All of the emphasis appears to be on technical issues – which are sensible 
given the country’s present lack of proven reserves, but thoughtful foresight and public policy planning 
can help the country avoid the curses that have affected the U.S. and other regions around the world. The 
ways in which current policy issues are resolved will say a great deal about how Poland’s energy 
economy will function for decades to come. 
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